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A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
During a military conflict, sea ports of the involved
nations become one of the main targets of the opposing
naval forces, because those are the places where
deployments of troops, equipments and supplies will be
held. In addition, beaches are also under great threat,
where disembarkation of amphibious troops and equipments
can be deployed without delay, allowing enemy forces to
infiltrate inside friendly lines.
In order to defend ports and beaches from a naval
attack or to establish a blockade of enemy ports, it is
attractive to lay down a minefield rather than to patrol
the same area and expose one's own forces to enemy action.
During war, time is one of the most important factors.
If troops, equipments, supplies or war vessels are urgently
needed in another theater of war, their absence or
difficulty in reaching it could be crucial. Delay may be
just as important as attrition in the mind of the minefield
planner. A minefield may achieve its objective without
sinking any ships at all.
In peace time, mine warfare can only be studied. It
cannot be practiced in the full sense of the term, as it is
impossible for the economic, strategic, or political
effects to be simulated. This study will focus on the
simulation of the traffic of ships through a minefield,
given specific characteristics of the mines.
B. IMPORTANCE OF NAVAL MINE WARFARE
Naval Mine Warfare is a simple concept which is not
fully appreciated. It is a relatively unknown subject for
many individuals in decision making positions, even within
the Navy, because they do not understand the
characteristics or principles of Mine Warfare.
The main idea of Mine Warfare is to let the enemy run
across the weapon, which lies in wait for its victim,
rather than to let the weapon seek the enemy. The mine,
once laid, is in constant readiness awaiting the
opportunity to attack. It remains on station waiting and
withholding its fire until its chance arrives. By
employing mines one can achieve maximum effectiveness at
minimum cost and risk to own forces.
Mine Warfare removes from consideration many of the
conventional aspects of Warfare, e.g., face to face combat
and the pursuit or capture of the enemy. Instead, Mine
Warfare gives the enemy the option of not advancing, not
moving his men and material by sea or risking severe losses
by attempting to do so. In general, the philosophy on the
use of mines has changed radically since the beginning of
their use. In the early days mines were considered by some
to be unethical; they were often referred to as devilish
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devices. Today mines are considered legitimate naval
weapons. This change of attitude has encouraged mine
designers to improve the weapon and to build a great deal
of sophistication into it. The modern mine is a smart
weapon.
Mines can be expected to be used increasingly as their
cost effectiveness is realized and as economic priorities
limit the growth of military budgets. This is especially
true in poorer countries of the world where military
budgets do not permit the acquisition of increasingly
expensive platforms and munitions.
C. OBJECTIVE
The objective of this thesis is to develop and evaluate
a simulation-based tool for assessing the effectiveness of
a minefield consisting of magnetic mines.
D. SCOPE
The contents of this thesis include:
Chapter I : A brief description of the problem and the
importance of Naval Mine Warfare.
Objective
.
Chapter II : History of Mine Warfare development and
its uses in different conflicts through
time. Mine International law.
Chapter III: General characteristics and types of mines
and minefields, with emphasis on magnetic
naval mines.
Chapter IV : Effects of Under Water Explosions.
Chapter V : Description of the simulation and a
hypothetical example of its application.
Chapter VI : Summary and recommendations for further
studies
.
II. HISTORY OF MINES AND THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. MINE DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN UNITED STATES CIVIL WAR AND
WORLD WAR I
Although the United States did very little research on
mines between the Civil War and the beginning of World War
I, other nations were very busy improving their mine
capabilities.
In 1868, the Herz horn method of firing independent
mines was invented by Dr. Herz, a member of the German Mine
Defense Committee. This invention consisted of an
electrolyte in a glass tube sheathed in a soft metal horn.
When bent by contact with a ship, the glass would break and
the electrolyte would complete the circuit in a battery
which could then fire the electric detonator. This same
year, moored and drifting mines were used in large quan-
tities in the conflict that took place in South America
between Brazil and Paraguay. In 1870, during the Franco-
German war, the Jode , Elbe and Weser rivers were defended
by minefields and thereafter the Germans took up the
development of mining material with considerable vigour.
In 1898, in the Spanish-American war, a minefield with
a small number of moored mines was planted around Santiago,
Cuba against the shipping operation of the American fleet.
There were no casualties [Ref. 1].
A major use of mines at sea in naval actions occurred
during the Russo-Japanese war in 1904. Mines played a
decisive role in this fight. The Japanese had realized the
value of submarine mines and they equipped their navy with
effective mines. At the very outset of the war, Russian
naval strength in the East was seriously reduced as a
result of attacks by the Japanese. The Russians,
therefore, decided to mine the Russian ports in order to
protect them. In all, Japan lost 2 battleships, 4
cruisers, 2 destroyers and 1 minelayer, while the Russians
lost 1 battleship, 1 cruiser, 2 destroyers and a few small
ships [Ref. 2] all to mines. This was the last conflict in
which only military forces were the main aggressors as well
as the main target. Subsequently, the sinking of
commercial shipping was frequently a deliberate goal of the
minefield planner.
B. USE OF MINES DURING AND AFTER WORLD WAR I
The Russo-Japanese war showed that mines were
formidable weapons, and provided practical experiences and
lessons for the other nations of the world. This war was
followed by intense development of mining techniques by the
Germans and British, with important assistance rendered by
the United States. The naval mine emerged as the Allies'
primary weapon against German submarines in World War I
[Ref. 11]
.
Although the Germans laid several defensive minefields
around their ports in order to keep out the British naval
forces, their major use of mines was really offensive,
laying mines in British estuaries and in their ports. The
most important development of the Germans in their North
Sea mine operations was the use of submarines as
minelayers.
In the first two years of the war, the British expe-
rienced a number of problems with the reliability of their
mines, due to the mechanical firing arm used. Later on,
they successfully employed the Hertz horn system. The new
mines helped to make an effective mine blockade in the
English Channel. A notable British development with great
future potential was the magnetic influence mine called the
M-Sinker
.
During 1914-1918, the British laid over 128,000 mines
of which around 40 per cent were in enemy waters in the
Heligoland Bight, the Kattegat, off the Belgian coast and
in the Mediterranean. The United States also laid over
56,000 mines in the Northern Barrage. The British also
laid large protective systems in the Dover area, in the
Thames estuary and off the Yorkshire coast [Ref. 3].
The Russians laid a considerable number of minefields
in the Baltic, the Black Sea and the Gulf of Finland. The
French assisted in the Mediterranean. The majority of the
neutral nations in Europe laid small minefields in order to
defend their own territorial waters.
As a result of all these activities, approximately 150
German warships and auxiliary ships were sunk, including
some U-boats.
The Germans laid over 43,000 mines, most of them in
small fields around England, France, Italy and Greece,
along the eastern shores of the Adriatic, in the Baltic and
Black Seas, etc. These mines inflicted Allied losses of
about 586 ships, including warships, auxiliary ships and
merchant ships [Ref. 2].
Mines had at last become accepted as having an impor-
tant and significant role to play in naval war strategy.
C. USES OF MINES DURING AND AFTER WORLD WAR II
Before the breakout of World War II in 1939, the
British, with the experience gained from the enemy's
tactics during World War I , had been formulating plans on
minelaying operation in order to be ready as soon as war
was declared. The first minefields to be laid after war
was declared were in British waters. The French cooperated
by laying further minefields off Dunkirk and in the inshore
channels
.
World War II German mines were, as a whole, cleverly
designed. The Germans boasted that they were going to use
a secret weapon which would be impossible to counteract or
recover, but the British were able to discover their secret
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when one of the magnetic mines was captured. The main
British response was the degaussing of ships. This proved
to be highly successful; in the early summer of 1940 the
number of sinkings through magnetic mines dropped
dramatically. But degaussing of ships was not the complete
answer, especially in shallow waters. A practical way of
sweeping and destroying mines also had to be found. This
was the next step in the war against German mines.
A battle of wits was beginning. By the end of 1940 the
Germans had introduced 2 new devices into their mines. The
first one was a counter device, and the second was an
arming delay which prevented the mine from coming alive
until after a preset time had elapsed. The effect of these
devices was to complicate the sweeping operation by the
Allies. At the same time the German acoustic mine was
introduced into the war, and still later a combined
magnetic-acoustic mine was developed. The last card played
by the Germans was the introduction of the pressure mine.
Each of these introductions led to corresponding
countermeasures on the part of the Allies.
As a result of Allied, and especially British, minel-
aying operations, about 1,050 Axis warships and merchant
ships were sunk and a further 540 damaged. The advent of
aircraft as minelayers had rendered traffic in waters under
enemy control more vulnerable to minelaying attack than it
was in World War I. The Germans, besides their great
ingenuity in the development of all types of mines, made
enormous use of aircraft and submarines as minelayers,
planting over 120,000 mines in the waters of Northwestern
Europe. The Italians also laid many mines in the Mediter-
ranean.
The total number of British and Allied ships sunk by
German mines was about 577: 281 warships of all types and
296 merchant ships. The total number of Allied merchant
vessels sunk was 521 [Ref. 2].
In the Pacific, the mining operation against the
Japanese was concentrated in four distinct areas: the
Southwest Pacific area, the India-Burma area, the Chinese
area, and the Central Pacific area. The need to eliminate
Japanese shipping traffic between the islands and the
mainland of Asia with Japan was apparent, and these 4
groups were planted in order to accomplish this objective.
This was really a starvation campaign against Japan.
The Allies planted 12,000 mines, of which approximately
4,900 mines were magnetic, 3500 acoustic, 3000 pressure and
700 low frequency-acoustic mines. The Japanese lost 670
ships, including 65 warships. Of these 294 were sunk, 137
damaged beyond repair, and 239 able to be repaired [Ref.
3].
A new family of mines, called "destructors", came into
use in 1967 during the Vietnam Conflict. The term
"destructor" was employed to circumvent any political
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implications resulting from the use of the term "mines"
[Ref. 4]. These destructors contained highly sophisticated
firing mechanisms which were emplaced in the general
purpose bombs.
The modern mine of today has come a long way since the
beginning, in terms of sophistication. Not only is the
mine more sophisticated and intelligent, but its strategic
potential has also steadily increased. It may be
unspectacular, but it is one of the most economical and
useful weapons ever built for control of the seas.
D. THE MINE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The only international agreement on the subject of mine
warfare is the "Convention Relative to the Laying of
Automatic Submarine Contact Mines", signed at the Hague in
1907.
The following are the main Articles stated in that
convention:
Article I
It is forbidden to lay unanchored automatic contact
mines unless they be so constructed as to become
harmless one hour at most after those who laid them
have lost control over them.
Article II
It is forbidden to lay automatic contact mines off
the coasts and ports of the enemy with the sole object
of intercepting commercial navigation.
Article III
When anchored automatic contact mines are employed,
every possible precaution must be taken for the
security of peaceful navigation.
The belligerents undertake to provide, as far as
possible, for these mines becoming harmless after a
11
limited time has elapsed, and where the mines cease to
be under observation, to notify the danger zones as
soon as military exigencies permit, by a notice to
mariners , which must also be communicated to the
governments through the diplomatic channel.
Article IV
Neutral powers which lay automatic contact mines
off their coasts must observe the same rules and take
the same precautions as are imposed on belligerents.
The Neutral Power must give notice to mariners in
advance of the places where automatic contact mines
will be laid. This notice must be communicated at once




At the close of the war, the Contracting Powers
undertake to do their utmost to remove the mines they
have laid, each Power removing its own mines.
As regards anchored automatic contact mines laid by
one of the belligerents off the coast of the other,
their position must be notified to the other party by
the Power which laid them and each Power must proceed
with the least possible delay to remove the mines in
its own waters.
Article VI
The Contracting Powers which do not at present own
perfected mines of the description contemplated in the
present Convention, and which, consequently, could not
at present carry out the rules laid down in Articles I
and III, undertake to convert the material of their
mines as soon as possible, so as to bring it into
conformity with the foregoing requirements.
Article VII
The provisions of the present Convention are only
applicable between the Contracting Powers, and only if
all the belligerents are parties to the Convention.
Article VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, AND XIII
These Articles dealt with the ratification of the
Convention, the accession of non-signatory Powers, the
date on which it should take effect, the period for
which it should remain in force, the reopening of the
question of the employment of automatic contact mines,
and the keeping of a register at The Hague. [Ref. 2]
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This Convention was due to reconvene in 1914, but World
War I intervened. Thus the Articles of 1907 remain the
sole instrument for the conduct of mine warfare today.
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III. CHARACTERISTICS AND TYPES OF MINES AND MINEFIELDS
Today's mines are designed to be deployed against many
different types and classes of ships, to achieve a variety
of results. However, in order to accomplish their various
missions, mines are being designed and constructed with
ever increasing complexity. The number of different
missions to be performed by mines is so large that no
single type of mine can be used for all purposes. Some of
them have a small explosive charge designed to be used
against vessels of small displacement. Others have a large
explosive charge to destroy or damage such capital ships as
frigates, cruisers, destroyers and merchant ships. Some
mines are constructed primarily to destroy submarines.
The increased complexity of mines is due primarily to
the computer intelligence built into their firing systems.
The same technology which makes mines more complex in some
ways also makes them simpler in other ways. The new mines
have features which make their assembly, testing and
stowing much safer and easier than was previously the case
with older mines [Ref. 5].
A. TYPES OF MINES
Mines can be classified according to three main
characteristics: position in the water, objective, and
method of actuation. We discuss each type in turn.
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1. Position In Water
From the standpoint of the position they assume in






These mines are very effective in shallow
waters. They lie on the bottom of the ocean, sometimes
buried in the mud, awaiting a passing ship. Bottom mines
do not normally move about once planted.
In deep waters, a surface ship can pass over a
bottom mine without actuating its firing mechanism, or may
not suffer much damage even if the mine activates.
Nevertheless, this type of mine can still be effective
against submarines when planted in deep waters.
Jb. Moored Mines
These mines are used for deep waters. They are
effective weapons against both submarines and surface
ships. The firing mechanism and its explosive charge are
housed in a positive buoyancy case.
This type of mine stays at a predetermined
depth below the surface, held by a cable which is attached
to an anchor on the sea bottom. It is free to move about
within the limits permitted by the cable.
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c. Drifting Mines
This kind of mine floats freely at or near the
surface of the water. Its buoyancy is approximately
neutral and the mine has a mechanism to keep it at a
certain constant depth. The Hague Convention of 1907
limits the use of this mine.
2. Objective Of A Minefield
Depending on the objective of the minefield, the
actuation of individual mines can fall into two main
categories
:
- controlled mines (defensive)
- independent mines (offensive)
as described below.
a. Controlled Mines
As their name indicates, these mines are always
under human control, sometimes being controlled completely
from an observation post ashore (so that the mine may be
detonated as desired) . Alternatively, shore control may be
limited to arming or disarming the firing mechanism,
letting the detonation of the mine depend on its own
sensors. The greatest defensive benefit of controlled
mines is to let friendly ships pass safely through the




Independent mines are used for all purposes
other than the close defense of own one's harbors and
ports. Once laid, they normally remain dangerous to any
friendly, enemy or neutral ship until they are swept or
scuttled. They may also encounter natural deterioration
which renders them harmless.
These mines are activated by the presence of a
ship, either by physical contact or by one of several in-
fluence mechanisms.
3. Method Of Actuation





Moreover, these methods of actuation can be used in
combination resulting in a diversified mix. These combina-
tions not only increase the mine's detection capability,
but also make countermining more difficult for the enemy.
a. Acoustic Mines
The acoustic mine is equipped with a hydrophone
as its detector. The acoustic firing mechanism converts
underwater sounds made by propeller and machinery noises
from ships into electrical signals for analysis and
processing. This firing mechanism responds only to sounds
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that are within a given frequency band. The mechanism must
be able to recognize underwater sounds that are being
produced by invalid targets, such as countermining ex-
plosions or marine life sounds. The recognition of a valid
acoustical signature detonates the mine.
b. Pressure Mines
These mines react to the phenomenon that a ship
in shallow water creates two pressure waves on the bottom
of the sea, separated by a low pressure area. The pressure
firing mechanism works together with pressure detectors to
detect and evaluate the presence and validity of a
potential target. If the analysis shows that a given
signal meets the specific requirements for a valid target
and lies within the mine's damage area, the mine explodes.
Otherwise it retains its charge and does not fire.
This is the most difficult type of mine to
sweep.
c. Magnetic Mines
This thesis now restricts itself primarily to
the study of the magnetic mine.
Today, most ships are made of iron and steel.
Even wooden ships have iron parts, such as nails and
machinery. These magnetic materials, immersed in the
magnetic field of the earth, acquire a net magnetization of
their own, made up of two parts: a permanent magnetization
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and an induced magnetization. We now discuss these two
types of magnetization.
The permanent magnetization of a ship depends
on its size and types of materials, as well as on where it
was built and the orientation of the keel in the shipyard.
This magnetization has horizontal, vertical and athwartship
components. These three components of induced magnetiza-
tion depend upon the ambient magnetic field of the earth.
This field depends on the ship's location. A magnetic mine
is constructed in such a way that a disturbance of one of
the components of the earth's magnetic field activates the
mine's firing mechanism. The magnetic firing mechanism
involves one of the following two types of target
detectors: the search coil or the magnetometer. Both of
these types give input to the firing mechanism, but they
differ in their method of detection.
Search coils are used to sense changes along
one axis of the earth's magnetic field. The presence of a
passing ship can cause such a change. The target detector
equipped with a search coil is excellent for bottom mines,
since these mines, once planted on the sea bed, assume an
unchanging position.
On the other hand, the magnetometer has a three
dimensional or total field detector. This mechanism is an
ideal detector for moored mines which, by their nature, are
constantly changing orientation because of an unstable
19
environment. The firing mechanism works in conjunction
with the magnetic detector, evaluating and analyzing if the
inputs are coming from a valid target operating within the
mine's damage range. If the analysis concludes that the
signal meets the requirements of an enemy ship, the mine
detonates
.
B. TYPES OF MINEFIELDS
1. Objective Of The Minefield





A defensive minefield is planted in waters
under a nation's own control. Its purpose is to protect
ports from enemy attack, to keep hostile submarines out of
harbors and entrances, and to deter an enemy invasion
force
.
During the Korean war the United States Navy
was barred access to the North Korean port of Wonsan due to
enemy minefields. The fleet Commander, Rear Admiral Smith,
informed the Pentagon that the U.S. Navy had lost command
of the sea in Korean waters. Admiral Joy was to say later
that,
20
no so-called subsidiary branch of the naval service,
such as mine warfare, should ever be neglected or
relegated to a minor role in the future. [Ref. 1]
It is apparent from this historic example that although the
U.S. Navy was a superior open-ocean naval force to the
North Koreans, defensive minewarfare was able to, at least
temporarily, defeat U.S. Navy objectives in the coastal
waters of North Korea.
Mines also may be used near a landing beach in
order to protect one's own amphibious forces from attack by
submarines or other kinds of vehicles. Defensive
minefields are often constructed with the mines under
control from a shore station. The minefield is laid out by
any type of vehicle, but primarily by surface ships.
Jb. Offensive Minefields
The principal characteristic of this type of
minefield is that the mines are planted in waters under
enemy control. The objectives are to attack and destroy
enemy shipping, to deny effective use of the enemy's ports,
or to establish a blockade by laying mines around shipping
lanes
.
Offensive minefields are constructed with
independent mines. Once planted, they do not distinguish
between friend or foe. Secrecy is often very important and
it is sometimes the key to a successful operation. The
minefield is usually laid by submarines or aircraft.
21
A recent use of an offensive minefield occurred
in the Persian Gulf in the 1980s, where the old fashioned
moored contact mine proved to be an effective weapon.
Mines do not have to be sophisticated to be effective.
2. Disposition Of Mines
According to how the mines are arranged in the






These are fields where the mines are planted
according to a specific pattern. Normally they are laid
out in a series of lines perpendicular to the direction of
the shipping lanes, with equal spacing between the mines in
each line. The field consists of a specific number of
lines that are parallel to each other. Each line has the
same probability of sinking a ship, assuming that the ship
has not been sunk before.
b. Random Minefields
In practice, due to time constraints or method
of deployment (ie., aircraft), it may not be possible or
desirable to plant a pattern minefield, but rather to lay
the mines in a random fashion without any predetermined
pattern. In order to do this effectively it is necessary
to know the distance a ship travels inside the minefield in
22
order to calculate both the area of the region to be mined
and the number of mines to be employed. This type of
minefield is often of the offensive type.
C. MINE DEPLOYMENT
Mines can be delivered to their respective stations by
submarines, aircraft or almost any type of surface ship,
possibly requiring a few modifications.
1. Surface-laid Mines
Surface laying is the most economical method of
delivery because a large number of mines can be carried in
the delivery vehicle. This type of delivery is used
primarily for defensive mining operations, and is typically
done by minelayers.
2. Submarine-laid Mines
This method of delivery is sometimes used in
offensive mining operations. The mines used for this type
of delivery system need a special configuration in order to
be launched from torpedo tubes. Tactically, submarines can
carry mines to great distances from the home port, but
they are limited in the number of mines they can take.
This may be considered as a disadvantage. However, when
secrecy is paramount, the submarine is the preferred





This method of deployment is typically employed in
offensive mining operations. The mines are delivered from
aircraft in much the same way as a bomb. The mines need to
have a special configuration for air drop to avoid damage
or premature explosion when the mine touches the water.
Aircraft have the capability for replenishing minefields
over a long period of time, without being exposed to
previously laid mines. Most aircraft that carry bombs can
lay mines.
D. MINE COUNTERMEASURES
The countermeasures employed in minewarfare can be
classified into three general types:
- Special equipment on ships
- Physical removal
- Circumnavigation.
1. Special Equipment On Ships
In order to prevent the actuation of the firing
mechanism of the mines, special equipment must be installed
on the ship. Such equipment varies with the type of mine
that a ship has to defend itself from.
Against magnetic mines, ships are equipped with
degaussing coils to reduce the disturbances produced by the
metal parts of the ship on the magnetic field of the earth.
Against acoustic and pressure mines, a limited
defense has been achieved in constructing less noisy
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machinery. The ship may be also steered more slowly and
quietly to produce less noise and water disturbance.
2. Physical Removal
This type of countermeasure employs sweeping
operations to be conducted before any ships can pass
through the minefield.
Depending on the method of actuation for bottom
mines, different types of sweeping activities must be
performed in order to destroy them. For magnetic mines, a
device that creates a disturbance on the vertical component
of the earth's magnetic field can be used to actuate the
mines. In the same way, a noise producer may be used to
actuate acoustic mines.
The most difficult type of mine to be swept is the
pressure mine. The difficulty lies in physically creating
a pressure disturbance great enough to explode the mine.
For this purpose a device that simulates a large ship is
used. However this operation is very expensive.
For moored mines, a cable with a paravane device,
to support the cable at its outer end and to hold it out at
an angle to the sweeper, is towed through the water.
Spaced along the cable are cutting blades which sever the
mooring lines of mines encountered. The mines then bob to
the surface and can be destroyed. [Ref. 5]
Minesweeping operations are expensive and time
consuming. They can only be successful to a partial
25
degree. One can never be completely sure that all the
mines have been totally eliminated.
3. Circumnavigation
For safety reasons, if the exact location of a
minefield is known and if shipping can be re-routed without
undue inconvenience, this procedure is often recommended.
26
IV. UNDERWATER EXPLOSIONS
A. UNDERWATER EXPLOSION PRINCIPLES
1. The Initial Shock Wave
When a charge is exploded under water a shock wave,
or instantaneous pressure pulse, is emitted in all
directions. This shock wave travels with the speed of
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Figure 1 - Diagram Of Shock Wave And Gas Bubble
Of An Underwater Explosion
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It has been found that the shock wave, expressed as
a relationship between pressure and time, can be approxima-
ted by the following function: [Ref. 6]
P = Po * e-t/® (1)
measured in pounds per square inch (psi) , where:
P = Shock-wave pressure at distance R
Po = Peak overpressure
t = Time after arrival of shock wave
e = Time constant for the pressure to decay to P© /e
Both the peak overpressure P© and the time constant
can be expressed as a function of the charge weight W
(pounds), and the distance R (feet). The peak overpressure
is: [Ref. 6]
Po = 21,600 * ( Wi /3 / R)i • 13 (2)
in pounds per square inch (psi).
The time constant is:
e = 0.058 * Wi/3 ( Wi/3 / R )-o.22 (3)
given in milliseconds (msec).
2. Bubble Pulses
Following the shock wave, a series of positive
pressure pulses are emitted by the gas of the explosive
charge. It has been found that the bubble expands until
the hydrostatic head of the surrounding water overcomes the
28
internal gas pressure. At this point the bubble collapses
and the gas is compressed into a small volume. The gas
expands again and the expansion and collapse cycle is
repeated.
For explosives, the time interval T (sec) between
the arrival of the first shock wave and the shock wave due
to the collapse of the the first bubble is expressed by:
[Ref. 7]
K * W* /
3
T = (4)
( D + 33 )»/6
where:
K = Proportionality constant, 4.36 for TNT
W = Charge weight in pounds
D = Depth of the detonation in feet
With increasing depth of detonation, the time interval
decreases and the pressure amplitude of the bubble in-
creases .
In attack situations where explosions occur near
the ship and especially if they occur under the ship, the
bubble pulses add significantly to the damage to the ship's
hull.
Bubble pulses are not considered in MINIPLAN since
the amount of energy carried by the shock wave is much
greater than the energy left in the bubbles [Ref. 12].
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B. THE SHOCK FACTOR
The likelihood of damage to a ship can be determined by
the following parameters: charge weight, explosion
composition, oceanic conditions, hardness and depth of the
ocean floor, position of the charge relative to the ship,
and the type of ship. A variable incorporating some of
these factors which gives a rough estimate of the damage
that might be incurred to the ship is known as the Shock
Factor.
The shock factor can be expressed as a relationship
between charge weight W, slant range R from the mine to the
hull, and the angle c< between the ocean surface and the
line from the hull to the explosive (see Figure 2) . The
shock factor is given by the following function [Ref. 8].
r'W 1 + Sin(a)
SHOCK FACTOR = S = (5)
where
:
W = Charge weight of explosive (TNT) in pounds
R = Slant range to hull in feet
a = Angle between the ocean surface and the line from the
explosive to the nearest point of the hull.
Each type or class of vessel is designed and
constructed to absorb without damage a specific shock
factor. For very small values of shock factor (about
0.001) , no damage occurs to the structure of the ship
30
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Figure 2 - Graphical Representation Of The Damage
Radius
(although the shock will be felt) . As the shock factor in-
creases, sensitive electronic equipment is broken, poorly
supported or corroded pipes and fittings are broken, and so
forth. Finally a higher value of the shock factor is
reached and the ship hull ruptures.
Research vessels can normally support a shock factor of
about 0.05 without significant hull damage. A factor of
0.01 is usually acceptable for most ships, although some
sensitive electronic systems may require a lower value of
about 0.003 to withstand damage. Military vessels are
designed to considerably higher standards to withstand
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greater shock factor values. The shock factor gives a good
estimate of a limit for withstanding damage to the hull.
In order to find the damage radius r related to the
shock factor, the first step is to replace the sin a in
equation (6) by D/r:
Sin a = D / r
where:
D = Depth of the explosive charge in feet.
Then the shock factor becomes
( V~ir) ( 1 + Sin(a) )
S =
2 R
2 R S = ( r~W ) ( 1 + D / R )
or after algebraic manipulation,
2 s R2 - r^w R - ^r~w D =
From the quadratic formula we find:
v~Tr + / W + 8 V^* D * S
R = (6)
4 S
where R is measured in feet.
From the Pythagorean Theorem the damage radius is given
by:
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r = V R2 - D2 (7)
where R^ - D* cannot be negative (R>D)
.
Given the specific shock factor at which hull rupture
is just barely achieved, knowing the explosive charge
weight, and the depth of the mine, the damage radius r can
be determined by equations (6) and (7). If the ship passes
inside the damage radius it will be sunk (but see chapter
5) . This computation can also be performed for different




V. IMPLEMENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF A MINEWARFARE MODEL
Minefield effectiveness may be judged in many different
ways. Threat, [P(8ink the first ship)] is one widely used
measure of effectiveness. One difficulty that may arise in
using this measure is that the mines have to be set very
sensitive in order to sink the first ship that enters the
minefield, consequently the influence areas of the mines
are large enough that the first ship that enters the
minefield may explode several mines, and the resulting
exhaustion of the minefield may let subsequent ships pass
clear.
There are various other measures of effectiveness that
can be considered to evaluate a minefield:
- The probability of sinking a given number of ships out
of a specific number of transitting ships.
- The probability that the "i th" ship will be sunk.
- The average number of penetrators out of a specific
number of transitting ships given a stopping value.
All these different measures of effectiveness can help
to study the effects of mines.
For purposes of this thesis, the number of transitting
ships is ten. So, in order to analyze the effects of the
mines, a simulation model written by Prof. Alan Washburn
was implemented and modified by the author and several
tests were conducted.
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A. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROGRAM
For the implementation mentioned above a Fortran
program called MINXPLAN was adapted for running on the IBM
PC or compatible microcomputer in an interactive mode. The
program runs for several thousand replications. In each
replication it generates normal random numbers to simulate
the locations of the ships and their sizes and uniform
random numbers for the locations of the mines. The program
is included in the appendix.
The output of the program is the probability of sinking
a specific number, say i ships out of ten ships, the
probability that the i th ship is sunk, and the average
number of penetrators out of ten ships given a specific
stopping value.
1. Sample Size
An important question that has to be answered when
dealing with a simulation program is:
- How many trials or replications are needed ( n ) ?
Usually, sample size n can be found when one value
is to be estimated by using a size requirement on the
confidence interval for that value. In our trials, we
estimated different values, not all independently. One
summarizing measure is the average number of penetrators
given a stopping value of 10 ships sunk, u, which is one of
the output values. We shall use a desired confidence
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interval size for this measure as a basis for determining
the sample size n.
A 95 % confidence interval around the mean can be
determined from the relationship






Sample mean of penetrator ships
Sample standard deviation of penetrator ships
Number of replications
Statistic based on assumption that x is normal
TABLE 1 - RESULTS ON 95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL AROUND THE MEAN
n X s C.I SIZE
1000 4.44 1.808 0.225
10000 3.969 1.758 0.069
As can be seen in Table 1, the more replications
one performs, the smaller the confidence interval. So, the
number of replications will depend on how big the user
wants the confidence interval to be. Subsequent results in
this thesis will be based on n = 10,000. For rough
preliminary work, however, n = 1,000 will suffice.
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2. Probability Of Actuation
The basic tool in determining if an actuation takes
place during a ship/mine interaction is the probability of
actuation (PACT)
.
This is the probability that the mine will detonate
given that a ship passes inside the area of influence of
the mine. This value (PACT) is set by the user. Setting
PACT < 1 is a kind of counter-countermeasure for the
protection of the mine against sweeping operations. Of
course setting PACT too low will let enemy ships pass by
without being damaged.
It is important to mention that if the mine does
not actuate for one passing ship, it does not imply that it
will not actuate for the next one.
3. Probability Of Damage
Given that the mine explodes, it is necessary to
test whether the ship is damaged or not. Although the
theoretical explanation in chapter 4 defined a damage
radius in which the likelihood of a ship being damaged is
either certainty or 0, the probability of damage will in
reality be a smoothly decreasing function of range. This
is due to a number of factors that complicate the
probability of damage as range increases. These factors
include oceanic conditions, bottom hardness, and
difficulties associated with making a mine go off at the
point of closest approach. One way to express this
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where R is ratio between the ship-mine distance and the
damage radius. This function decreases smoothly as R in-
creases, with the point of steepest slope being at R «
0.707.
4. Ship Size Effect
In building a minefield it is necessary to consider
the size (displacement) of the transitting ships, since not
all the ships entering the field are of the same size.
The bigger the ship, the bigger the chance that the
mine will explode, due to the iron and steel parts of the
ship and its magnetic influences.
In MINAPLAN, every ship has a size (displacement)
chosen from a lognormal distribution. Let D be the
displacement (in tons) of a target ship and d be the median
displacement (in tons) ship of its class. Then W =
Ln(D/d) is a normal random variable with mean. The
variance of W depends on the target population, an input to
MINAPLAN. For simplicity the variance used in subsequent
examples in this thesis is assumed to be 1.
5. Mine Influence
Assume that the magnetic moment M of a ship is
proportional to the ship's displacement D:
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M = K X D
in gauss cm^ , where K is the proportionality constant.
Treating the ship as a magnetic dipole, the
magnetic field at range r is:
M / r3 = (K * D) / r3 .
The mine will detect the magnetic influence if
(K*D)/r3 ^ s,
where s is the sensitivity of the mine (in gauss)
.
Dividing both terms in the last inequality by d/DAM^
gives
:
[(K * D)/r3] / [d/DAM3 ] ^ s/ [ d/DAM3 ] or
(D/d)/(r /DAM)3 ^ (s * DAM^ )/(K * d)
Taking the natural logarithm of each side results in
Ln [ (D/d)/(r/DAM)3 ] ^ Ln [(s * DAM3 )/(K * d)
]
Setting - SEN equal to the right hand side, this can be
written as:
Ln (D/d) - 3.0 * Ln (r/DAM) i - SEN (8)
If inequality (8) is satisfied, then the mine is influenced
by the passing ship. Since W « Ln (D/d) and R =
r/DAM, (8) can be rewritten
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W - 3.0 * Ln (R) + SEN ^ 0, (9)
the form used in MINAPLAN.
The variable SEN could be defined by:
SEN = Ln [ (K * d)/s * DAM^ ] = Ln{Bo/s),
where Bo = Magnetic field of a standard ship at a distance
equal to the damage radius of the mine. When the
sensitivity of the mine is such that a standard ship at
damage distance is just barely detectable, then SEN = 0.
It is important not to make the mine so sensitive that it
can be detonated by a ship passing at a distance so far
away that no damage is done. On the other hand, a mine
with a sensitivity setting so low that most ships are
allowed to pass by is equally undesirable. A principal
purpose of MINAPLAN is to aid the minefield planner in
setting mine sensitivity.
B. STRUCTtmE OF THE PROGRAM
1. Definition of the Variables
The variables used in the program are defined as
follows
:
- NMINE : number of mines planted on the crossing line
of width equal to FIELDW, chosen as the
entrance sector by the transitting ships.
- WEIGHT : charge weight of explosive (in lbs of TNT)
.
- DEPTH : depth of the mine (in feet)
.
40
- SEN : sensitivity factor of the mine. This is a
setting in logarithmic form for the mine's
sensitivity to changes in magnetic field.
- NSHIP : number of ships to enter the minefield.
- DAM : damage radius of the mine (in feet) , which is
a function of the weight, depth and shock
factor.
- SIGMAl : standard deviation of the position of the
ship to the center of the path (in feet)
.
- SIGMA2 : standard deviation of the size of the ship.
- FIELDW : is 6 * SIGMAl + 2 * DAM (in feet).
- SHOCK : shock factor.
- Y(J) : location of the J-th mine.
- Z : position of the ship with respect to the
center of the channel.
- W : is the natural logarithm of the ratio between
the size of the ship D in tons and the median
size ship d in that class in tons.
- PACT : probability of actuation of the mine.
- PRODAM : probability of damage.
- R : ratio between the ship-mine distance and the
damage radius.
- P(I) : probability that I out of NSHIP ships are
sunk (1=0, 1 , 2, ..., NSHIP)
- S(I) : probability that the I-th ship is sunk (I =
1, 2 NSHIP)
- Q(I) : average penetrators out of NSHIP ships if the
stopping value is I. (1 = 1, 2 NSHIP)
- I : number of ships.
- KREP : number of replications.
2. Algorithm
- Step 1 : Input the information to the program : either
setting the values beforehand or
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interactively during the execution.
Constants are assigned to the following
variables:
- NMINE - NSHIP - SIGMA2
- WEIGHT - SIGMAl - SEN
- DEPTH - SHOCK - PACT
- KREP
Step 2 : Calculates the damage radius of the mine
using the formula below:
V WEIGHT + / (WEIGHT+8* /WEIGHT*DEPTH*SHOCK)
RD =
4 SHOCK
DAM = / RD2 - D2
< DAM <
Step 3 : Determines the field width applying the
following expression:
FIELDW = 6 * SIGMAl + 2 * DAM
Step 4 : Generates normal random numbers for
representing location and size of the ships.
Location = Z = [normal rnd number] * [SIGMAl]
Size = W = [normal rnd number] * [SIGMA2]
Step 5 : Generates uniform random numbers that
correspond to the location of mine (j).
Y(J) = FIELDW * [unif rnd number - 0.5]
Step 6 : Checks if there still exist any mines in the
path of a ship. If not, the program tries
another ship.
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- step 7 : Checks if the mine is influenced by a passing
ship, considering:
- The Size of the ship W
- The ratio R = ABS ( Z - Y(J) ) / DAM indicates the
relative position of the ship with respect to the
mine.
- The sensitivity of the mine SEN by:
IF ( W - 3.0 * ALOG(R) + SEN < )
If this expression is true, then the mine does not
activate. Return to step 6.
- Step 8 : A uniform random number is generated and
compared with the probability of actuation
PACT set on the mine. If the mine actuates,
the program continues to step 10. Otherwise
return to step 6.
- Step 9 : Checks the damage of the ship. If the ship
is not damaged go to step 6. Otherwise
record the ship as a casualty and consider
the next ship.
- Step 10 : Computation of P(I), S(I), Q(I) after KREP
thousands replications.
- Step 11 : Output of the different probabilities.
The program has the flexibility of allowing the
user to select which variables to fix (setting values in
the program before execution) , according to the analysis
desired.
C. AN EXAMPLE
To illustrate the algorithm described above, consider
the following example:
The variables considered fixed are:
- NMINE = 10
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- NSHIP = 10
- SIGMAl = 50 feet
- SHOCK =0.35
- PACT = 0.85
- SIGMA2 = 1.
- KREP = 10,000
The information to be entered interactively is:
- WEIGHT = charge weight of explosive (TNT) = 300 lbs
- DEPTH = Depth of the mine = 35 feet
- SEN = Sensitivity factor of the mine = 0.5
The results of the program are shown in Table 1. A
graphic representation of the probability that the I th
ship is sunk, S(I), is also depicted in Figure 3.
Since the ships enter the minefield in a column
formation, the first ships have the higher probability of
being sunk. This is confirmed by the shape of the curve of
S(I), shown in Figure 3.
D. ASSUMPTIONS AND TESTS CONDUCTED
1. Assumptions
In reality there may be many distinct kinds of
mines available using different influences or combinations
of influences with different sensitivity settings. Also
there are several types of possible sweep operations that
can be employed. For simplicity, the tests conducted in
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TABLE 1 - RESULTS ACHIEVED
I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
P(I) .007 .041 .122 .223 .261 .198 .107 .034 .007 .001 .000
S(I) .723 .638 .551 .469 .394 .331 .267 .218 .191 .147
Q(I) 0.54 1.51 2.86 4.27 5.32 5.84 6.03 6.07 6.07 6.07
2 4 6 8
NUMBER OF THE !-TH SHIP
Figure 3 - Probability That The I-th Ship Is Sunk
this study were performed based on the following
assumptions
:
- The mines are planted at random.
- The type of mine planted is a moored mine.
- The influence type of the mine is magnetic.
- The number of ships to enter the minefield is 10
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- The ships enter the minefield in a colximn formation,
having a deviation due to navigation errors from the
center of the path chosen.
- The mines are all set with the same charge weight of
explosive, depth and sensitivity.
- There are no sweeping or countermeasure operations.
- All ships are of the seune type, but with different
size.
- After being influenced by a ship, a mine detonates or
not depending on its probability of actuation.
- The shock factor chosen for these tests is 0.35.
2. Test Conducted
Consider a nation that has a limited number of a
certain type of magnetic mine and that needs to protect a
particular entrance against enemy shipping using mines.
Assume the minefield characteristics as stated before in
Section C.
Considering this scenario, we concentrate our
analysis in the study of the effects caused in the
probability of sinking i ships out of NSHIP, P(I), the
probability that the i-th ship is sunk, S(I), and the
average number of penetrators out of NSHIP given a specific
stopping value, Q(I). The decision maker is concerned
about the effects of the depth, DEPTH, and sensitivity,
SEN, settings of the mines.
The intervals of these variables considered here
are from 15 to 35 feet (in steps of 5) for the depth and
from -1.5 to 1.5 (in steps of 0.5) for the sensitivity.
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The results achieved after running the program for
all the possible combinations are presented on the Tables 2
through 6
.
Depending on the information of interest required
by the top command, the tactical situation and the data
available, the planner will conduct his analysis and will
suggest the settings that will provide the most effective
minefield. In order to demonstrate how the analysis could
be performed, it was considered that the staff of the navy
needs assistance with respect to five main measures of
effectiveness
:
- Probability that at least 1 ship is sunk.
- Probability that at least 5 ships are sunk.
- Probability that the first ship is sunk.
- Probability that the third ship is sunk.
- Average niimber of penetrators given the stop value of
3.
For evaluating the effects of depth and sensitivity
settings in the situation under consideration and to
present a recommendation for achieving better results for
each MOE, we use the information contained in Tables 2 to
6. Also, a graphical representation of the information is
depicted in Figures 4 through 13. These plots help to
confirm visually the settings of depth and sensitivity that
will lead to better values for the MOEs
.
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TABLE 3 - RESULTS OF THE PROGRAM










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5 - Contour Plot Indicating P (1^1)
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Figure 7 - Contour Plot Indicating P (1^5)
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Figure 8 - Tridimensional Plot Indicating The Probability
That The First Ship Is Sunk
-1 1
SENSITIVITY
Figure 9 - Contour Plot Indicating The Probability












Figure 10 - Tridimensional Plot Indicating The Probability
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Figure 11 - Contour Plot Indicating The Probability
That The Third Ship Is Sunk
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Figure 12 - Tridimensional Plot Of The Average Number





Figure 13 - Contour Plot Of The Average Number Of
Penetrators If The Stopping Value Is 3
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The settings that correspond to the highest
probability that at least 1 ship is sunk are sensitivity
equal to -0.5 and depth equal to 15-25 feet. The curves in
Figures 4 and 5 above confirm the results obtained from the
Tables and also indicate that higher probabilities are
achieved for points inside the shadowed areas, i.e., for
example, for depth values between 20 to approximately 25
feet and sensitivity between -0.5 to -1.0.
Based on the Tables, the biggest probability that
at least 5 ships are sunk is obtained when the sensitivity
is set to 0.5 and at 20 feet of depth. The plots also
suggest that the probabilities are greater for the points
in the shadowed area.
The graphics contained on Figures 4, 5, 6, and 7
confirm that the more ambitious we want to be with the
number of sunk ships, the lower the probability of success
we will have.
The graphs on Figures 8 and 9 show that the
probability that the first ship is sunk increases with
positive values of the sensitivity setting. In this case
the depth does not have as big influence as the sensitivity
does.
As appears in Figure 9, bigger probabilities
correspond to a sensitivity setting of 1.5, and for depths
between 15 and 28 feet (shadowed area)
.
58
Figures 10 and 11 present a visual representation
of the probability that the third ship is sunk. As is
obvious, the highest probability in this case is smaller
than the previous case where the probability was of the
first ship.
Points in the shadowed area represent the biggest
probability that can be achieved in this situation. For
example a probability of sinking of 0.64 can be obtained
when setting the mines at sensitivity of 1 and laying them
at depths between 15 and 30 feet.
The tridimensional graph of Figure 12 and the
contour plot of Figure 13 depict the average number of
penetrators for a stopping value of three. This number
indicates how many ships, on average, will cross the
minefield until three ships are sunk.
In this case the smallest number is the best
solution, therefore for example setting the sensitivity to
1 and the depth to 20 feet would give us an average number
of penetrators of approximately 2 ships. Again the
shadowed area represents the best solution.
Tests and analyses like the ones conducted in this
chapter can be carried on, once the top command defines the
MOE to be considered when constructing a minefield.
Sometimes the MOE of interest is a multiple MOE.
In this situation the intersection of the individuals MOE's
shadowed areas will represent the best solution.
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B. AHALYSIS OF THE RUNNING TIME
A way to measure the performance o£ a simulation
program is by the running time. The more efficient a
program is designed the less time it consumes during
execution.
Micro-processor clock speed has an obvious effect on
the solution time.
The following is an analysis of MINJLPLAN running time
for an IBM PC/XT with the 8087/80287 math coprocessor,
using Ryan-McFarland Fortran, Version 2.10.
The running time of the program depends in large part
in how the uniform and normal random numbers are generated
by the computer, so an analysis of these procedures is
developed below.
1. Uniform Random Numbers
For the generation of uniform random numbers, a
Fortran implementation of generator 1 was used [Ref. 9].
This generator is widely used, and its performance
thoroughly tested. It is considered to be a good uniform
random number generator.
2. Normal Random NuBibers
Much of the running time in the program is due to
the generation of normal random numbers. Consequently,




Two methods using an exact technique £or
generating standard normal random numbers were examined:
(1) Method 1. Using both equations of Box and
Muller [Ref. 10]:
Z = (-2 * Ln{Ui)) * COS( 2*n*U2
)
Z = (-2 * Ln{Ui ) ) * SIN( 2*n*U2
The simulation program requires 20 normal
random numbers per replication allowing 10 of them for
location of the ships and the other 10 for size of the
ships. With these 2 equations it is necessary to have a
loop repeated 10 times to obtain 20 uniform random numbers.
(2) Method 2. Using a single equation of Box
and Muller [Ref. 10]
:
Z = (-2 * Ln(Ui)) * COS( 2*n*U2
In order to generate the 20 normal random
numbers needed per replication, a loop repeated 20 times
must be constructed generating 40 uniform random numbers.
b. Approximation Technique
(1) Method 3. This method uses an
approximation to normality, expressed by the following
equation:
Z = 5Iui - 6
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This method uses 12 uniform random numbers
to generate 1 normal random number. Thus, to generate the
20 normal random numbers needed per replication it is
required to generate 240 imiform random numbers.
Table 7 shows the various running times
obtained by using the above methods for 10,000
replications.
TABLE 7 - RESULTS OF THE RUNNING TIME
Method Used Running Time
1 Z =(-2*Ln(Ui ) )* COS(2*n*U2)
Z =(-2*Ln(Ui ) )* SIN(2*n*U2)
9 min 15 sec
2 Z = (-2*Ln(Ui))* COS(2*n*U2) 10 min 25 sec
3 Z = Lui - 6 19 min 40 sec
As seen in Table 7, the most efficient
method of the three is the Box-Muller (method 1) . This
method is also easy to program and does not require
calculation of the inverse function or excessive computer
memory. This method requires one twelfth of the random
numbers required by the approximate technique.
Trigonometric functions and logarithm calculations are
relatively inefficient in a computer, but these
inefficiencies are outweighed by the large number of
uniform random numbers needed by the approximation
technique.
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VI. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDIES
This thesis presents a study about one of the most
important subjects in today's Naval Warfare: Mine Warfare.
It starts by describing the history of mine warfare, its
development and uses through time. Then it states general
characteristics and types of mines. It also presents some
important concepts on under water explosions. A Fortran
program that simulates the passage of a given number of
ships through the minefield is described and implemented.
The usage of the program with a follow-on analysis of its
results either for the evaluation of the effectiveness of a
specific minefield or as a part of the decision process in
how to better set the mines is demonstrated.
Areas for further research are:
- Consider the use of different types of mines.
- Consider the employment of sweeping operations by the
enemy forces.
- Consider the use of counter-counter measures such as:
- Time delay setting on the mines.
- Ship counter setting.
- Consider the use of mines with different charge weights of
explosive in the same minefield.
- Considered the use of mines with different sensitivity








* Date : 23 / March / 1989
* Variable definition :
* NMINE : number of mines planted on the crossing line of *
* width equal to FIELDW, chosen as the entrance *
* sector by the transitting ships. *
* WEIGHT : charge weight of explosive (in lbs TNT)
.
*
* DEPTH : depth of the mine (in feet)
.
*
* SEN : sensitivity factor of the mine. This is a setting *




* changes in magnetic field. *
* NSHIP : number of ships to enter the minefield. *
* DAM : damage radius of the mine (in feet) , which is a *
* function of the weight, depth and shock factor. *
* SIGMAl : standard deviation of the position of the ship to *
* the center of the path (in feet)
.
*
* SIGMA2 : standard deviation of the size of the ship *
* FIELDW : is 6 * SIGMAl + 2 * DAM (in feet). *
* SHOCK : shock factor. *
* Y(J) : location of the j-th mine. *
* Z : position of the ship with respect to the center *
* of the channel. *
* W : is the natural logarithm of the ratio between the *
* size of the ship D in tons and the median size *
* ship d in that class in tons. *
* PACT : probability of actuation of the mine. *
* PRODAM : probability of damage. *
* R : ratio between the ship-mine distance and the da- *
* mage radius. *
* P(I) : probability that I out of NSHIP are sunk. *
* S(I) : probability that the I-th ship is sunk. *
* Q(I) : average number of penetrators out of NSHIP if the *
* stopping value is I. (1=1, 2, ... NSHIP ). *
* KREP : number of replications. *
* I : number of ship. *
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* Subroutines : *
* *
* LRNDPC : subroutine to generate uniform random numbers. *





******** DECLARATION OF THE VARIABLES ********
PARAMETER (NUM = 50)
REAL P{NUM), S(NUM), Q(NUM), Y{NUM), U(NUM), X{NUM), WEIGHT
REAL SHOCK, DEPTH, R, Z, DAM, FIELDW, CONV, SEN, SIGMAl
REAL SIGMA2, PRODAM, PACT
INTEGER NSHIP, NMINE, KREP , NNUM
DOUBLE PRECISION DSEED
CHARACTER*! ANSWERl , ANSWER2
DATA P , S
, Q / NUM * . , NUM * . , NUM * . /
DATA X , Y , U / NUM * . , NUM * . , NUM * . /
******** INITIALIZATION OF THE VARIABLES ********
C Number of ships (NSHIP) , std navigation error (SIGMAl)
C standard deviation of ships' size (SIGMA2)
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J
200 NSHIP = 10
SIGMAl = 50.
SIGMA2 = 1
C Number of mines (NMINE) , the prob of actuation (PACT)




300 PRINT*, • INTRODUCE THE NUMBER OF REPLICATIONS IN UNITS OF
CTHOUSANDS ( 1, 10 ) : '
READ*, KREP





******** INFORMATION INPUT *********
400 PRINT*, 'ENTER THE CHARGE WEIGHT (lbs), DEPTH OF THE MINE
(ft) :'
READ*, WEIGHT, DEPTH
PRINT*, 'ENTER THE MINE SENSITIVITY :'
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READ*, SEN
******** CALCULUS OF THE DAMAGE RADIUS OF THE MINE ********
RD = (SQRT (WEIGHT) + SQRT (WEIGHT + (8 * SQRT (WEIGHT) *
DEPTH * SHOCK) )
)
RD = RD / (4 * SHOCK)
RR = RD * RD - DEPTH * DEPTH
ZERO =0.0
IF( RR .LE. ZERO ) THEN
PRINT*, • THE MINE IS TOO DEEP TO CAUSE ANY DAMAGE ON




****** CALCULUS OF THE FIELD WIDTH OF THE SHIPPING PATH ******
FIELDW = 6 * SIGMAl + 2 * DAM
****** TO HOLD PROBd SUNK), PROB(ITH SUNK), AND AVERAGE ******
****** NUMBER OF PENETRATORS AT STOP LEVEL I ******
DO 50 K = 1, KREP





****** GENERATION OF NORMAL RANDOM NUMBERS ******
CALL LNORMPC(DSEED,X,NN)
NMINE = MINE
IF( NC .LT. NUM-NMINE* (NSHIP+2) ) GO TO 5
NC =
NNUM = NUM
****** GENERATION OF UNIFORM RANDOM NUMBERS ******
CALL LRNDPC(DSEED,U,NNUM)
****** ASSIGMENT OF LOCATION TO EACH MINE ******
5 DO 10 J = 1, NMINE
NC = NC + 2
Y(J) = FIELDW * { U(NC) - 0.5 )
10 CONTINUE
****** PASSAGE OF THE SHIPS THROUGH THE MINEFIELD ******
DO 30 I = 1, NSHIP
****** POSITION OF THE SHIP ******
Z = X(I) * SIGMAl
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****** SIZE OF THE SHIP ******
W = X(I+NSHIP) * SIGMA2
J =
12 J = J + 1
13 IF (J .GT. NMINE) GO TO 30
***** CHECKING IF A SHIP IS INSIDE THE DAMAGE RADIUS *****
R = ABS{Z - Y(J) / DAM








PRODAM = EXP (-0.5 * R * R)
END IF
END IF
***** VERIFYING IF THE J-TH MINE IS INFLUENCED BY A SHIP *****
IF(W - 3.0 * LOG(R) + SEN .LT. 0)G0 TO 12
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***** CHECKING THE PROBABILITY OF ACTUATION OF THE MINE *****
NC = NC + 1
IF( U(NC) .GT. PACT) GO TO 12
***** RE-INDEX THE REMAINING MINES *****
NMINE = NMINE - 1
IF (J .GT. NMINE) GO TO 18
DO 15 L = J, NMINE
Y(L) = Y(L+1)
15 CONTINUE
18 NC = NC + 1
***** CHECKING IF THE SHIP IS DAMAGE *****
IF( U(NC) .GT. PRODAM ) GO TO 13
P(I) = P(I) + 1
S(NK) = S(NK) + I - NK
NK = NK + 1
30 CONTINUE
35 Q(NK) = Q(NK) + 1
IF(NK .GT. NSHIP) GO TO 45
DO 40 I = NK, NSHIP





DO 60 I = 1, NSHIP
P(I) = P(I) * CONV
S(I) = S{I) * CONV
Q(I) = Qd) * CONV
60 CONTINUE
NK = NSHIP + 1
Q(NK) = Q(NK) * CONV
******* PRINTING THE OUTPUT OF THE PROGRAM *******
WRITE(6,65)NSHIP, NSHIP
65 FORMAT (' PROBABILITY THAT I OUT OF ', 13, 'SHIPS ARE SUNK
C{I= 0, 13, ) : •/)
WRITE (6, 70) KREP
70 FORMAT (/ ' PROBABILITY THAT THE I-TH SHIP IS SUNK (',12,'
CTHOUSAND REPLICATIONS) : '/)
WRITE(6,80) (P{I) , 1=1, NSHIP)
WRITE(6,80) (S(I) , 1=1, NSHIP)
WRITE{6,80) (Q(I) , 1=1, NSHIP)
80 FORMAT (11F7. 3)
WRITE(6,90) NSHIP
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90 FORMAT (// ' AVERAGE PENETRATORS OUT OF', 14, ' IF STOPPING
CVALUE IS I : '/ )
******* RUNNING AGAIN THE PROGRAM *******
WRITE (6, 110)





IF (ANSWERl .EQ. 'N') GO TO 100
IF (ANSWERl .EQ. 'n') GO TO 100
WRITE(6,120)
120 FORMAT (// 'DO YOU WANT TO CHANGE THE NUMBER OF SHIPS (NSHIP
C), MINES (MINE), NAVEGATION ERROR (SIGMAl), PROB OF ACTUATIO
CN (PACT) , SHOCK FACTOR (SHOCK) , STANDARD DEVIATION OF




IF (ANSWER2 . EQ . 'N') GO TO 200
IF (ANSWER2 .EQ. 'n') GO TO 200
WRITE (6,130)
130 FORMAT (//'INTRODUCE THE VALUES FOR NSHIP, NMINE , SIGMAl,
CPACT, SHOCK, SIGMA2 : ' )
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SUBROUTINE TO GENERATE NORMAL RANDOM NUMBERS
PARAMETER (NUM = 50)
REAL U(NUM)
DOUBLE PRECISION D31M1, DSEED
DATA D31M1 / 2147483647 .DO /
DO 5 I = 1 , NNUM
DSEED = DMOD( 16807. DO * DSEED, D31M1)






* SUBROUTINE TO GENERATE NORMAL RANDOM NUMBERS *
* *
DOUBLE PRECISION DSEED
PARAMETER (NUM = 50)
REAL X(NUM), U (NUM), PI
NNUM = NN + 1
CALL LRNDPC{ DSEED, U, NNUM)
DO 5 I = 1, NN
X(I) = (-2 * ALOG(U(I)) )**.5 * C0S(2 * PI * U(I+1))
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